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Wanting, Liking, and Learning:  
Neuroscience and Paternalism  
Colin F. Camerer† 
A large number of young children die every year from ingesting 
poisons by accident. Revealed-preference theory, the foundation of mi-
croeconomics, has only two concepts to explain these accidents: beliefs 
and preferences (that is, utilities revealed by choices). In the belief-
preference language, all we can say is that a child who died of acciden-
tal poisoning either believed the poison was safe, and made a mistake, 
or that the child preferred death to life, and committed suicide. While 
economic theory may be comfortable calling these accidents only mis-
takes or expressions of preference, I am not. My goal in this Essay is to 
acquaint the legal audience with ideas emerging in neuroscience that 
could potentially be a richer language for talking about cases like ac-
cidental child poisoning and, more broadly, about welfare and pater-
nalism in some limited cases. Further development of the framework 
could lead to a broader view with wider applicability. 
The idea is that three separable neural systems are relevant for 
choice and welfare: a hedonic “liking” system (welfare), a “wanting” 
system that guides choice, and a learning system that, ideally, links 
information stored in the other systems so that people choose to learn 
what they truly like. Other multiple-process neuroeconomic accounts 
use different components but have similar implications.1  
                                                                                                                      
 † Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics, California Institute of 
Technology. Thanks to conference participants, to Meghana Bhatt, Ming Hsu, and Ian Krajbich 
for research assistance, and to Alice Lin for a presentation on the Berridge work. 
 1 See Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine, A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (Aug 
17, 2005), online at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fudenberg/papers/dual_self.pdf (vis-
ited Jan 17, 2006) (arguing that a simple “dual-self” model explains empirical irregularities in self-
control problems and can give a value for commitment in decision problems); Isabelle Brocas and 
Juan D. Carillo, The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (Aug 2005), online at http://www-
rcf.usc.edu/~juandc/PDFpapers/wp-brain.pdf (visited Jan 17, 2006) (constructing a model of con-
sumption and time allocation that is solved using tools from mechanism design and economics of 
information); B. Douglas Bernheim and Antonio Rangel, Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision 
Processes, 94 Am Econ Rev 1558, 1561 (2004) (proposing a model of addiction that is premised on a 
pathological divergence between choice and preference consisting of mistakes, environmental cues, 
and attempts by users to minimize their mistakes); George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue, 
Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior (July 27, 2004), online at 
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/workshops/behavioral/lowenstein.pdf (visited Jan 17, 2006) 
(discussing a model of human behavior based on the interaction of a deliberative system and an 
affective system); George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 Org 
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The Essay is organized in several parts. Part I sets the historical 
stage and then describes a canonical experiment (with mice) on want-
ing and liking. Part II describes anecdotal evidence of wanting-liking 
gaps from psychological disorders and choices over time (addiction 
and credit card use). Paternalism enters in Part III, not with much 
vigor, but as a potentially efficient response to gaps in wanting and 
liking. Part IV suggests some directions for positive analysis. Part V 
concludes.  
I.  REVEALED PREFERENCES AND WANTING-LIKING 
A. History of Thought: The Revealed-Preference Approach Is a 
Convention 
In the early 1900s, Vilfredo Pareto won a debate among economists 
about the epistemological basis of utility,2 a victory later cemented in 
the 1930s by the ordinalist revolution.  
Pareto and his contemporaries, such as Edgeworth and Jevons, all 
believed in the “concrete deductive method” of John Stuart Mill, 
which starts with simple empirical regularities or “laws” and makes 
deductions from those regularities.3 Furthermore, all of these scholars 
believed that understanding the hedonic basis of utility was necessary, 
in a form that is now called psychology (but was not called psychology 
then). As Jevons wrote: “But it is surely obvious that economics does 
rest upon laws of human enjoyment; and that, if those laws are devel-
oped by no other science, they must be developed by economists. . . . 
[T]he theory of economics must begin with a correct theory of con-
sumption.”4 
Pareto’s view was the opposite: he thought rooting economic 
preferences in psychological detail was an unnecessary burden. In an 
1897 letter Pareto wrote: 
                                                                                                                      
Behav & Hum Dec Proc 272 (1996) (attributing actions against self-interest despite full knowl-
edge to visceral factors defined by a direct hedonic impact and an effect on the relative desirabil-
ity of different goods and actions).  
 2 Consider Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden, The Road Not Taken: Two Debates about 
the Role of Psychology in Economics 1, 2 (unpublished manuscript 2002) (on file with author) 
(explaining that the behavioral economics movement is trying to reverse the approach initiated 
by Pareto and others to remove psychology from economics). 
 3 Later, Milton Friedman’s essay, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Milton 
Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 3 (Chicago 1953), liberated economists from even hav-
ing to start with empirical regularities. He suggested that simple assumptions with no empirical 
backing could also serve as a starting point, because they might lead to accurate predictions 
despite being “wrong.” His “F-twist” is best seen as encouraging a reduced-form style of model-
ing in which incorrect foundational assumptions might lead to good predictions because they 
approximate predictions from more accurate foundational assumptions that are left unspecified. 
 4 W. Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy 102–03 (Penguin 1970) (arguing 
that knowledge of the conditions of human utility are necessary to understand economics).  
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It is an empirical fact that the natural sciences have progressed 
only when they have taken secondary principles as their point of 
departure, instead of trying to discover the essence of things. . . . 
Pure political economy has therefore a great interest in relying as 
little as possible on the domain of psychology.5  
Pareto advocated divorcing economics from psychology by sim-
ply assuming that unobserved utility is necessarily revealed by choice 
(though stay tuned): “[W]e are concerned only with certain relations 
between objective facts and subjective facts, principally the tastes of 
men. Moreover, we will simplify the problem still more by assuming 
that the subjective fact conforms perfectly to the objective fact.”6  
While Pareto was comfortable severing economics from psychol-
ogy, some of his contemporaries were not. Writing about him in 1926, 
shortly after Pareto died, Edgeworth said:  
[Pareto’s] The Manuale is distinguished by the original idea of 
treating the laws of demand and supply, or rather the “curves of 
indifference” from which those may be deduced, as objective, ca-
pable of being ascertained by external observation without the 
psychological knowledge obtained through sympathy. In short, 
the economist may be a solipsist. The conception has been criti-
cised . . . as a needless abandonment of one large source of in-
formation.7 
Remember that Pareto did not win this argument about how to 
proceed by mathematical proof or data. The equation of utility with 
choice was not a scientific discovery on par with a powerful theorem 
or solid empirical regularity. Pareto simply asserted that, as a matter of 
convenience, it was okay to give up on understanding the “essence of 
things.” Pareto thought economics could start with “secondary princi-
ples” like utility-maximization (which, ironically, are now taught to 
graduate students as “first principles”). Pareto’s turn—the definition 
of utility as a quantity revealed by expressed preference equation—
                                                                                                                      
 5 Bruni and Sugden, The Road Not Taken at 20 (cited in note 2).   
 6 Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy 103 (Augustus M. Kelley 1971) (emphasis 
added) (arguing in favor of simplifying problems to the objective facts by considering only re-
peated actions where the actor has corrected previous mistakes and has determined his or her 
exact preferences so that subjective preferences are identical to objective facts).  
 7 Francis Y. Edgeworth, Pareto, Vilfredo, in Henry Higgs, ed, 3 Palgrave’s Dictionary of 
Political Economy 711 (MacMillan 1926) (surveying Pareto’s works and criticism of those works) 
(internal citation omitted). Solipsism is “a theory holding that the self can know nothing but its 
own modifications and states . . . [and] that the self is the only existent thing.” Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 2170 (Merriam-Webster 1993). That is, the world is a figment of 
one’s imagination. Solipsism is not taken seriously as a philosophical stance; it is just a challenge 
for philosophers to explain precisely why it is wrong. 
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was an agreement on a convention for how to do economics, like the 
rules of tennis, or assuming away friction in physics.  
Of course, the equation of utility and choice was also historically 
justifiable in the early 1900s because measuring utility directly, at that 
time, was as far-fetched as, say, sending people to the moon or cloning 
animals. In Pareto’s day there was no ability to place electrodes into a 
monkey or human brain and record firing rates of individual neurons, 
to alter genes in mice and see what those mice can’t do, to record 
online brain activity with 3-mm spatial resolution using PET or fMRI, 
to identify areas of brain damage (lesions) in humans and see what 
skills those humans lack, to genotype people and correlate genes with 
behavior and skill, to give humans drugs and see how their behavior 
changes, or to create “temporary lesions” using transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS). 
The huge advances in all these tools force the reader to draw one 
of two conclusions: (1) Pareto was right in his own time—he and his 
peers shouldn’t have tried to measure utility directly, it was hopeless—
and his intellectual heirs are still right today, because their tools can’t 
possibly measure utility, or (2) Pareto was right then because the tools 
didn’t exist, but the neo-Paretians are wrong now because we have 
tools to measure utility that didn’t exist in Pareto’s time (and the tools 
will only get better). Conclusion (1) might be right, but betting that 
something is impossible in science is dangerous and neglects the op-
tion value of exploring wild ideas. Conclusion (2) is the progressive 
conclusion with upside potential.  
The ideas in this Essay are not an insistence that revealed-preference 
theory has not been useful. It has, and will continue to be. But the useful-
ness of one theory tells us nothing about whether an alternative approach 
might prove equally useful.  
B. Beyond Revealed Preference: Types of Utility 
The distinction between utility and choice has been revived in 
two ways.  
First, Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin noted that one can concep-
tually distinguish four types of utility: experienced utility (the hedonic 
sensation at the time of consumption that Jeremy Bentham had in 
mind); remembered utility; forecasted utility (a forecast of experi-
enced utility); and finally, the familiar notion of decision utility (num-
bers an observer could use to rank an agent’s revealed preferences).8  
                                                                                                                      
 8 See Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explora-
tions of Experienced Utility, 112 Q J Econ 375, 376–77 (1997); Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges 
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Thinking like a psychologist, it is easy to see why these types of 
utility might differ. Remembered and experienced utility can differ 
because of nostalgic biases in memory (for example, the inability to 
recreate the pain of childbirth in imagination). Forecasted utility could 
be subject to “projection biases” relative to experienced utility—people 
buy more groceries when they’re hungry,9 and overestimate how badly 
they will feel if their favored candidate loses an election.10 Most fun-
damental for my purposes, decision utility could deviate from experi-
enced utility if people have not yet learned what they like (for example, 
children), or if there is some dissociation between wanting and liking.  
The revealed-preferences view basically equates welfare (experi-
enced utility) with choice (decision utility), as a matter of the defini-
tion of welfare. Is this the best we can do? If my neighbor thumps his 
head repeatedly with a ball-peen hammer, do I have no alternative but 
to infer that hammering his head with a ball-peen hammer is the most 
fun he can have? A more sensible direction is to study the relation 
between experienced and decision utility empirically.  
The second revival of the debate about utility is work by the psy-
chologist Kent Berridge and colleagues on “wanting,” “learning,” and 
“liking” that addresses the measurement challenge, suggesting some 
ways in which experienced utility (liking) and decision utility (wanting) 
might differ, depending on learning that potentially links the two.11 
My suggestion in this short Essay is that the wanting-learning-
liking distinction provides a potential basis, grounded in neuroscience, 
for asserting that choices are not always utility-maximizing. In fact, the 
learning part of this framework was clearly endorsed by Pareto as a 
justification for assuming that the “subjective fact” of utility and the 
“objective fact” of revealed preference are the same. A longer quota-
tion containing the short excerpt quoted above, reads: 
We will study the many logical, repeated actions which men per-
form to procure the things which satisfy their tastes. . . . [W]e are 
concerned only with certain relations between objective facts and 
subjective facts, principally the tastes of men. Moreover, we will 
simplify the problem still more by assuming that the subjective 
                                                                                                                      
to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J Institutional & Theoretical Econ 18, 21 (1994) (discussing 
the distinction between the two primary notions of utility: experienced and decision).   
 9 See George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in 
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q J Econ 1209, 1215 (2003). 
 10 See Daniel T. Gilbert, et al, Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 75 J Personality & Soc Psych 617, 625 (1998). 
 11 See Kent C. Berridge and Terry E. Robinson, Parsing Reward, 26 TRENDS in Neurosci-
ences 507, 510–12 (2003) (discussing the interactions of wanting, learning, and liking in condi-
tioned stimuli as motivational magnets, cue-triggered “wanting,” response reinforcement, and 
cognitive incentives). 
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fact conforms perfectly to the objective fact. This can be done be-
cause we will consider only repeated actions to be a basis for 
claiming that there is a logical connection uniting such actions.12  
Pareto clearly implicates learning as a mechanism that brings 
wanting and liking together: 
A man who buys a certain food for the first time may buy more 
of it than is necessary to satisfy his tastes, price taken into ac-
count. But in a second purchase he will correct his error, in part 
at least, and thus, little by little, will end up by procuring exactly 
what he needs. We will examine this action at the time when he has 
reached this state. Similarly, if at first he makes a mistake in his 
reasoning about what he desires, he will rectify it in repeating the 
reasoning and will end up by making it completely logical.13 
Thus, the standard assumption, that choices reveal “true” utilities, 
is clearly endorsed by Pareto only for choices that are repeated often 
enough to ensure that learning has occurred. The wanting-learning-
liking framework can therefore be seen as a proper generalization of 
revealed-preference theory and, in fact, it is perhaps the kind of gen-
eral theory Pareto had in mind in the first place. Bruni and Sugden 
note that the “discovered preference hypothesis” is a revival of Pareto’s 
idea.14 They assert that rational choice theory applies after preferences 
have been “discovered” by trial-and-error learning and reflection. But 
this leaves a large and important hole: what happens before learning?  
Besides generalizing revealed-preference theory, the wanting-
learning-liking framework provides a potential way to talk scientifi-
cally about how restricting or imposing choices (paternalistically) 
could improve welfare. The core idea is simple: if there are separate 
systems for recording liking, expressing wanting, and for learning to 
want what the brain likes, then paternalism could be justified if the 
wanting system produces choices that are not later liked, and if a pa-
ternalistic correction produces choices that are unwanted by an agent 
but will be liked by her, or that are wanted but not liked, and if the 
correction does not cause other harms (or much harm to rational 
agents).  
                                                                                                                      
 12 Pareto, Manual of Political Economy at 103 (cited in note 6) (emphasis added). 
 13 Id (emphasis added).  
 14 See Bruni and Sugden, The Road Not Taken at 7 (cited in note 2) (labeling the claim that 
rational-choice theory can predict behavior when certain criteria are satisfied as the “discovered 
preference hypothesis”). See also Charles R. Plott, Rational Individual Behaviour in Markets and 
Social Choice Processes: The Discovered Preference Hypothesis, in Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, eds, 
The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior 225, 226 (St. Martin’s 1996) (suggesting a the-
ory that rational choices evolve through three stages reflecting experience and practice). 
File: 06.Camerer (final) Created on: 1/27/2006 11:35 AM Last Printed: 1/31/2006 2:30 PM 
2006] Neuroscience and Paternalism 93 
By the way, note that I am truly not an eager paternalist. I could 
care less about paternalism, per se. Paternalism is only interesting as a 
challenge for behavioral economics, both normatively and positively 
(to make sense of paternalism that is currently practiced, and changes 
in paternalism across time and geography).  
At this point, the neuroscientific basis for any practical paternal-
ism is flimsy. But progress in neuroscience is very rapid. And of course, 
there is a genuine danger of a slippery slope in moving from paternal-
ism that is designed to be unobjectionable, because it helps some and 
doesn’t harm others, to paternalism that is scary, intrusive and wrong-
headed. The political economy of capture by special interest groups 
also should make us wary, in practice, that opening the door to even 
the mildest paternalism could get out of hand. But it can’t hurt to in-
stigate a purely academic debate about how limited paternalism might 
someday be scientifically justified, subject to a reasonable consensus 
of scientists, lawyers, and citizens.  
C. Wanting-Learning-Liking Illustrated 
I will motivate my discussion by starting with details of a simple 
experiment with mice by Peciña and colleagues.15 Their experiment 
uses mice with a dopamine transporter (DAT) “knockdown” due to 
genetic engineering. As I understand it (which is not well), the knock-
down mice produce only about 10 percent as much dopamine trans-
porter (which “takes up” or recycles dopamine) as the control mice, 
but as a result have 70 percent more extracellular dopamine sloshing 
around between neurons.  
When freely allowed access to food and drink, the DAT-knockdown 
mice consumed twice as much as the control mice. This difference, by 
itself, does not tell you whether they liked the consumption or just wanted 
it more. 
The mice were also put through a standard “runway” task, in 
which they are kept hungry for eight hours, then trained to move 
down a short runway from a start box to a goal box containing food. 
During a learning period, the DAT-knockdown mice ran about twice 
as quickly down the runway as the control mice and were much less 
likely to reverse course or pause and sniff. Because the knockdown 
and control mice are about equally fast in a pretraining phase, and 
                                                                                                                      
 15 See Susana Peciña, et al, Hyperdopaminergic Mutant Mice Have Higher “Wanting” But 
Not “Liking” for Sweet Rewards, 23 J Neuroscience 9395 (2003) (finding that chronically elevated 
extracellular dopamine in mutant mice facilitates “wanting” but does not increase “liking”). 
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equally fast after a lot of training, this difference during learning sug-
gests that extra dopamine facilitates faster learning.16  
These experiments show that the DAT-knockdown mice eat 
more, and learn there’s food waiting in the goal box faster than the 
control mice do, but do they actually like food and liquid more? Here 
we have no choice but to skate out onto thin empirical ice: how do you 
measure liking?  
If you are open-minded about the possible difference between 
choice, which is observable, and liking (true utility), which is not as 
readily observable, then you should accept that any measure of true 
utility won’t be as sharp and agreeable as observing choice is. If you 
aren’t willing to accept this sad fact, stop reading now.  
Peciña and colleagues measure liking and disliking using physical 
movements of the mice—tongue protrusions and paw licking to repre-
sent liking, and gaping (mouth-opening, like a yawn), screwing up the 
face, and arm flailing to represent disliking. Your first reaction might 
be that these are not serious scientific measures. But they are taken 
very seriously by people who study animals, because they are the best 
available measures of liking17 (putting observed choice aside, of course; 
if you use choice to infer liking we’re back to square one with Pareto). 
These expressions and movements are also very similar across mice, 
primates, and human infants; in fact, they are so similar that research-
ers use an equation (d = .26(w).32) to predict the duration (d) of a fa-
cial expression (in milliseconds) in terms of a species’ body weight (w) 
(in kilograms).18 
In any case, these measures of liking and disliking show that the 
DAT-knockdown mice do not like the sucrose solution more than the 
control mice. In fact, 1.0 M sucrose, the largest concentration, is liked 
significantly less by the knockdown mice.19  
                                                                                                                      
 16 See Samuel M. McClure, Nathaniel D. Daw, and P. Read Montague, A Computational 
Substrate for Incentive Salience, 26 TRENDS in Neurosciences 423, 424 (2000). 
 17 Methods like this are used by pediatricians to judge how much pain children are in. An 
“oucher” scale is used by pediatricians to map facial expressions onto a numerical scale. See, for 
example, How to Use the Oucher, online at http://www.oucher.org/differences.html (visited Jan 
17, 2006). See also, for example, Rita Rubin, Kids’ Distress Is No Small Thing, USA Today D1–2 
(May 9, 2005). This can be thought of as a utility function that maps facial expressions into nu-
merical “true disliking.” If the goal is to prescribe an optimal dose of painkiller, you can’t just let 
a child “choose” a dose. Therefore, inferring children’s disutility—pain—from choice is a bad 
idea. Inferring their pain from facial expressions is a good idea.  
 18 See Berridge and Robinson, 26 TRENDS in Neurosciences at 509 (cited in note 11).  
 19 A concern in the study is that the eating task used regular food (Purina Rat Chow) and 
water; the learning task used Froot Loops; and the liking measures used sucrose solution. I pre-
sume Peciña and colleagues are comfortable with the working hypothesis that knockdown mice 
do not have different tastes for any of these substances than control mice do. See also Kent C. 
Berridge and Terry E. Robinson, What Is the Role of Dopamine in Reward: Hedonic Impact, 
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This is just one study that shows a potential dissociation between 
wanting and learning, which the knockdown mice reveal more of, and 
liking, which they reveal less of. They eat and drink more, but don’t 
seem to like it.  
The same kinds of wanting-liking dissociations have been shown in 
experiments with humans.20 Dopamine-receptor antagonists appear to 
suppress cigarette-smoker wanting without changing (self-reported) 
pleasure from cigarettes.21 Environmental cues create learned association 
with pleasurable drug use; when these cues are presented they can create 
rapid craving, just like the conditioned stimulus produced salivation in 
Pavlov’s dogs. These cues are clearly affecting wanting, though they may 
not affect eventual liking. 
An important property of the wanting and liking systems is that 
they may react implicitly, without consciousness. For example, drug 
addicts will work (lever-pressing) for doses of stimulants or morphine 
that are so low that the addicts report no subjective effects and have 
no measurable autonomic responses. That is, the addicts detect enough 
of the drug to keep wanting the low doses, but don’t think they are 
getting any dose at all.22  
Berridge and Robinson suggest general regions of the mouse brain 
that are responsible for wanting, liking, and learning.23 Nobody has con-
structed such a neurogeographical map of utility for the human brain, 
and it will be a long time before we have a good one. (Furthermore, 
utility for food, shopping, drugs, sex, and golf may all work differently, 
so we’ll need a book of brain maps.) But the point is that such a map 
has already been proposed for mice, based on a relatively recent and 
modest amount of research. So it is conceivable that at least a rough 
                                                                                                                      
Reward Learning, or Incentive Salience?, 28 Brain Rsrch Revs 309, 350 (1998) (finding that do-
pamine-depleted rats still “like” rewards and simply fail to “want” rewards).  
 20 See Berridge and Robinson, 26 TRENDS in Neurosciences at 508 (cited in note 11) 
(discussing how drug addicts will work for low doses of stimulants or morphine despite no sub-
jective effect). See also Carl L. Hart, et al, Methamphetamine Self-administration by Humans, 157 
Psychopharmacology 75, 80 (2001) (“[S]everal investigators have reported data demonstrating 
that drug-related ‘positive’ subjective effects do not entirely account for drug-taking behavior 
and some have suggested that other factors should also be considered.”).  
 21 See Lisa H. Brauer, et al, Haloperidol Reduces Smoking of Both Nicotine-containing and 
Denicotinized Cigarettes, 159 Psychopharmacology 31, 34–35 (2001) (discussing experimental 
results where haloperidol, a dopamine-receptor antagonist, was administered and significantly 
reduced smoking behavior but did not affect how much the subjects liked smoking).  
 22 See Berridge and Robinson, 26 TRENDS in Neurosciences at 508 (cited in note 11). 
 23 See id at 510  (containing a schematic explanation of regions of the brain that are linked 
to wanting, liking, and learning). Their analogous terms are motivation (wanting) and emotion or 
affect (liking). Id at 508. 
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understanding of wanting, learning, and liking could emerge for hu-
mans, probably at first for a specialized domain like food.24 
Having separate systems for wanting, learning, and liking makes 
sense from an evolutionary point of view. Take food as a simple case. 
First note that unless tastes for specific foods are truly genetically 
hardwired, some kind of learning system is necessary to connect the 
sensory properties of food—how it smells, feels, and looks—to how 
much an animal likes specific foods. This basic learning is what infants 
do for months—putting everything in sight in their mouths to see how 
things taste. An infant who tastes dirt doesn’t anticipate liking dirt—
she just exhibits wanting, which is really just wanton exploration (to 
create inputs for the learning system). Then she gradually learns the 
difference between brown, crumbly stuff that tastes bad—dirt—and 
brown, crumbly stuff that tastes good—gooey brownies. 
The fact that the learning system exists at all is prima facie evi-
dence that wanting and liking are not automatically linked at birth; 
learning is there for a reason, and the reason is to educate the wanting 
system about what is liked. But why would wanting and liking occur in 
separate brain regions? Berridge and Robinson propose that liking for 
food, sex, and warmth rely, at least to some extent, on quite different 
sensory systems for processing smell, heat, and taste. A separate want-
ing system is needed to combine these signals into a “common cur-
rency,”25 in order to make tradeoffs between goods that are liked in 
(sensorily) different ways.  
Wanting and liking may also deviate, usefully, in the special case 
of pregnancy. When my wife was pregnant, she had a fierce craving for 
lamb—one of her favorite foods—then almost vomited after taking 
one bite. Her wanting system had tuned to her own tastes but the cir-
cuitry protecting the delicate fetus registered rapid dislike.  
Learning is the mechanism that trains wanting about what is actu-
ally liked by trial-and-error. However, in the modern economy, many of 
the goods people purchase are much more complex to process and rep-
                                                                                                                      
 24 A similar body of research in humans focuses attention on “actor-critic” models of tem-
poral difference (TD) learning. In TD learning, an organism learns a value function according to 
an adaptive updating equation driven by the prediction error (or temporal difference). John 
O’Doherty and colleagues have located areas of striatum (in the brain’s temporal lobe) that 
correspond to “critic” temporal differences, and other areas that correspond to an “actor’s” 
expected reward or forecast. John O’Doherty, et al, Dissociable Roles of Ventral and Dorsal Stria-
tum in Instrumental Conditioning, 304 Science 452 (2004). In terms of this Essay, the actor is 
wanting, and the critic system is learning, which adjusts wanting so it learns the true value (liking).  
 25 See Peter Shizgal, On the Neural Computation of Utility: Implications from Studies of 
Brain Stimulation Reward, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, Well-
Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 500, 509–10 (Russell Sage 1999) (discussing the 
necessity and existence of a currency function to break down different stimuli into decision 
utility (wanting)).  
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resent than are simple foods. The learning necessary to link wanting 
and liking of such goods through trial-and-error reinforcement is ei-
ther impossible (planning the perfect once-in-a-lifetime wedding) or 
very slow.  
Other mechanisms may substitute for direct learning about com-
plex choices (personal advice, imitation, advertising). But it is not likely 
that the human brain has developed a special patch for unique impor-
tant decisions that links imitation directly to actual liking. At best, hu-
mans would have a capacity to learn at a young age whose advice to 
take (i.e., they develop a tightly coupled wanting-liking loop for good 
advice; and advice that is taken then triggers wanting for a good, which 
is a sensible forecast of later liking because that’s what “good advice” 
means). Such a system might work well, but probably not perfectly, and 
might be vulnerable to exploitation by profit-maximizing firms (for ex-
ample, celebrity endorsements might hijack such a system).  
II.  HUMAN MISFIRES IN WANTING AND LIKING 
A. Disorders 
The most compelling examples of wanting-liking gaps are patho-
logical disorders that people clearly would like to change if they could.  
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a psychiatric disorder 
characterized by obsessive thoughts and compulsive actions, such as 
cleaning, checking, counting, or hoarding.26 “Cleaners” report an in-
tense feeling that their hands are not clean, and must be washed over 
and over to reduce that feeling. “Checking” is similar. My father used 
to compulsively check the four oven stove dials in our house before 
leaving the house—he would point to each and say “off, off, off, off,” 
partly coping with embarrassment by making fun of his mild checking 
compulsion. Sometimes he would stop the car, halfway out the drive-
way, and get out to double-check that the front door was locked. 
In the revealed-preferences approach, we would infer that compul-
sive cleaners have a high utility for clean hands. Some sensible predic-
tions may come from this inference—for example, cleaners spend a lar-
ger income share on cleaning than noncleaners do. 
But the revealed-preferences view only gets you so far. If you 
give compulsive cleaners a serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) like 
fluoxetine (Prozac) or paroxetine (Paxil), a majority of cleaners find 
                                                                                                                      
 26 Note that the DAT knockdown mutant mice exhibit “sequential super-stereotypy” in 
grooming that is remarkably similar to OCD cleaning in humans. See Kent C. Berridge, et al, 
Sequential Super-stereotypy of an Instinctive Fixed Action Pattern in Hyper-dopaminergic Mutant 
Mice: A Model of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Tourette’s, 3(4) BMC Biology (2005), 
online at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1741-7007-3-4.pdf (visited Jan 17, 2006). 
File: 06.Camerer (final) Created on:  1/27/2006 11:35 AM Last Printed: 1/31/2006 2:30 PM 
98 The University of Chicago Law Review [73:87 
that their symptoms are diminished. Of course, we can easily stretch 
revealed-preference language to allow “state-dependence” of clean-
ing-utility, which is altered by these drugs. But patients actively seek 
out these drugs to change their preferences. To talk about the demand 
for a cure, we need to posit a “metapreference” in which cleaners pre-
fer to be symptom-free than to be compulsive. Their metapreference is 
expressed in demand for Prozac or Paxil. 
A big advantage of revealed-preference theory is simplicity. But 
adding concepts of state-dependence and metapreference quickly makes 
the theory complicated, not simple. And even if enriched revealed-
preference theory can accommodate these phenomena, the details of 
how preferences are linked to genes and childhood behavior, how 
“states” like SSRI drugs work, and whether agents understand the source 
of their behavior and the state-dependence, which all matter for good 
prediction, require a lot of empirical input from outside economics per se.  
The language of wanting and liking could be even simpler. In 
wanting-liking terms, an OCD patient wants to clean but does not like 
it. Most say that they do not like cleaning per se—it can be very time-
consuming, doesn’t bring pleasure, and direct measurement (facial 
expressions, self-report, imaging of striatum activity) would probably 
show that liking is low. But such a patient is motivated, compulsively, 
to clean (she “wants” to). SSRI drugs reduce wanting. Patients take 
medication to override their wanting system.  
The OCD example is a relatively easy one. Of course, the want-
ing-liking framework is useful only if there are more common behav-
iors, with substantial economic consequences, that can be seen as re-
flecting wanting-liking gaps. Most of the obvious examples have to do 
with time preference, which I’ll discuss in the next Part.  
Another interesting example is the behavior of “shopaholics.” 
Compulsive shopping is a disorder with formal diagnostic criteria analo-
gous to those for compulsive drug use or gambling.27 I will use it as a 
casual example just because it is a name for a possible disconnect be-
tween the transitory pleasure from buying goods and the later pleasure 
from consumption. A different class of behavior involves “virtuous in-
tentions” like buying exercise equipment or a health club plan.28  
                                                                                                                      
 27 See Lorrin M. Koran, et al, Citalopram Treatment of Compulsive Shopping: An Open-
Label Study, 63 J Clin Psychiatry 704, 704 (2002) (showing that treatment with the antidepres-
sant citalopram (Celexa) reduces shopping compulsion). 
 28 Stefano Della Vigna and Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym 22 (unpub-
lished manuscript 2005), online at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/sdellavi/wp/gymemp05-04-
20.pdf (visited Jan 17, 2006) (explaining the irrational behavior of gym users’ contract choices 
based on their overestimation of future efficiency or self-control). 
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An economist’s definition of shopaholism is systematically buying 
goods that are not later consumed.29 Such a disorder could result from 
a wanting system buying goods that the liking system doesn’t appreci-
ate (like closets full of shoes that are never worn). Of course, in the 
language of belief and preference, one could argue that shopaholics 
are mistaken in their beliefs about future consumption (or their budget 
of time to use goods). Then the challenge is explaining why they don’t 
learn from a chronic pattern of purchase and disuse.  
An extreme form of shopaholism is an OCD disorder called “col-
lecting” or “hoarding” in which people collect items to an extreme. A 
milder form is probably present in all of us: most people have at least one 
class of goods or services they enjoy shopping for, but they don’t have 
enough time or inclination to actually consume. Mine is books—I love 
getting books, but never get around to reading them all. My wife is ob-
sessed with buying marinades. We have around twenty, which are invaria-
bly opened once and then sit patiently for years, three-quarters full.  
B. Wanting and Integration of Momentary Liking over Time 
Food is a useful kind of good for exploring the neural basis of 
wanting and liking, because mechanisms are common across species 
and consumption is immediate. But for most goods and services of 
economic interest to humans—education, savings, durables, credit card 
use—costs and benefits are spread out over time. It may be very un-
comfortable to learn to windsurf or to struggle through college (the 
liking system is not happy during the learning), but rewards come in 
the form of later liking (windsurfing) or future liking of goods that can 
be bought with increased wages from a college education. The wanting 
system has to integrate these likes and dislikes over time to determine 
overall liking.  
One method for integrating liking is exponential discounting of 
future rewards, which corresponds to dynamic consistency in choice 
and has much normative appeal.30 A more general approach is models 
of present-biased preferences (for example, quasihyperbolic discount-
ing),31 which splice a preference for immediacy and conventional dis-
                                                                                                                      
 29 The closest clinicians come to an economic definition is the “[f]requent buying of more 
than can be afforded, more than is needed, or for longer periods of time than intended.” Kim 
Bullock and Lorrin Koran, Psychopharmacology of Compulsive Buying, 39 Drugs of Today 695, 
696 (2003). 
 30 For short-lived episodes where discounting is likely to be weak (for example, evaluating 
an operation, a movie or a weekend getaway), Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin propose and axio-
matize a rule that takes the integral of momentary liking over time. 112 Q J Econ at 390 (cited in 
note 8). 
 31 See Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 Am Econ Rev 103, 
106 (1999) (discussing preferences as time-inconsistent or present-biased, meaning that a per-
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counting of future rewards.32 These preferences can be characterized as 
reflecting behavior of a wanting system that weights current liking too 
heavily, compared to exponential discounting. Let’s consider two ex-
amples: addictive drugs and credit card spending.  
1. Addictive drugs. 
The hallmarks of addictive drugs are tolerance (larger doses are 
needed to produce equal hedonic sensations) and withdrawal (un-
pleasant physical sensations during abstinence). A natural and fruitful 
way to model these effects is through state-dependence of current 
utility on past consumption;33 or a richer view in which states are nu-
merical summaries of use histories that go up or down when addicts 
use or abstain.34 In any case, a central issue is whether potential addicts 
rationally anticipate how current consumption creates tolerance and 
possible future withdrawal. A key prediction of the rational addiction 
model is that current consumption responds to expected future price 
changes, as it appears to do.35 Aggregated data are too coarse, however, 
to tell whether some potential addicts refuse to start, or whether ac-
tive users quit, in the face of future price increases.  
In the wanting-liking view, addiction means that wanting can be 
created by a desire to avoid the pain of withdrawal, or is triggered by 
craving (“self-medication”), but the drug administration is not actually 
                                                                                                                      
son’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date versus a later date will change depend-
ing on when he or she is asked); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q 
J Econ 443, 445–46 (1997) (discussing how decisionmakers foresee their own dynamically incon-
sistent discount rates over short horizons (high) and long horizons and commit themselves to 
nonliquid assets to constrain their future selves).  
 32 See Samuel M. McClure, et al, Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed 
Monetary Rewards, 306 Science 503, 506 (2004) (describing how separate functions exist in the 
brain associated with immediate preferences (possibly reflecting evolutionary adaptations) and 
abstract future preferences and how these separate functions may explain the idiosyncrasies of 
human preferences). 
 33 See generally Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 
J Polit Econ 675 (1988) (describing a theory of rational addiction that is partially based on what 
state of addiction an addict is in). 
 34 See Bernheim and Rangel, 94 Am Econ Rev at 1565 (cited in note 1) (modeling addic-
tive states by incrementing or decrementing the state of addiction based on decisions to use or 
not to use—a higher state corresponds to greater addiction, for example, someone in state 8 is 
more addicted than someone in state 5). 
 35 See Gary S. Becker, Michael Grossman, and Kevin M. Murphy, An Empirical Analysis of 
Cigarette Addiction, 84 Am Econ Rev 396, 397 (1994) (discussing how a one-period price in-
crease of 10 percent reduces consumption in the previous period by 0.6 percent). See also Jona-
than Gruber and Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q J Econ 
1261, 1273 (2001) (showing that consumers increase consumption by hoarding cigarettes in an-
ticipation of future tax increases); Angela A. Hung, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Addic-
tion 86–87, unpublished PhD dissertation, California Institute of Technology (2001) (finding that 
cigarette consumers are forward-looking in respect to prices).  
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pleasurable. (At best, it cures the withdrawal symptoms; but other 
cures, like rehabilitation or methadone, which do not feed the addic-
tion as self-medicating doses do, may be available.) As Bernheim and 
Rangel suggest, it is sensible to entertain the idea that when craving, 
addicts’ wanting systems are not fully accounting for the future dislike 
(or internality) created by current use. This phenomenon is not easily 
explained by hyperbolic discounting, because exogenous cues—like 
seeing drug use in a film—can trigger craving.36 
2. Credit card spending. 
For the sake of argument, suppose that at least some consumers 
charge too much on their credit cards, in the sense of revealing a want-
ing-liking gap (at least ex post). This may be due to poor understand-
ing of how interest rates work (for example, how rapidly interest com-
pounds) or insufficient appreciation for the status quo bias of sticking 
with one card after an introductory “teaser rate” period lapses.37  
Another possibility, in wanting-liking terms, is that the brain likes 
walking out of a store (or clicking an internet radio button, or calling 
an 800-number and imagining goods being shipped), but the wanting 
system does not anticipate the “pain of paying” when the credit card 
statement arrives.38 That is, current wanting does not integrate future 
dislike.  
III.  PATERNALISM 
I adopt the textbook definition of paternalism as “the interfer-
ence of a state or an individual with another person, against his will, 
and justified by a claim that the person interfered with will be better 
off or protected from harm.”39  
In my terms, paternalism could be justified, in terms of a person’s 
own welfare, if the wanting system does not produce what the liking 
                                                                                                                      
 36 See David Laibson, A Cue-Theory of Consumption, 116 Q J Econ 81, 82–83 (2001) (ex-
plaining a cues model that assumes that the presence of cues (sensory inputs) linked to past 
consumption affects habit formation). 
 37 See Haiyan Shui and Lawrence M. Ausubel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Mar-
ket 1, 27–28 (14th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference, May 2004), online at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers?.cfm?abstract_id=586622 (visited Jan 17, 2006) (explaining that a 
hyperbolic model is necessary to explain consumer behavior in the credit card market).  
 38 See Drazen Prelec and George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting 
of Savings and Debt, 17 Marketing Sci 4, 23 (1998) (describing mental methods including pro-
spective accounting and decoupling that allow consumers to enjoy acquisitions at the moment of 
purchase with a credit card without considering the unpleasantness of paying their credit card 
bill when it comes due). 
 39 Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy (2006), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism (visited Jan 17, 2006). 
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system likes and if the intervention creates more liking than the per-
son would achieve on his own or with market-supplied help.40  
Ideally, such paternalism would be “libertarian” in the sense that 
it would only intervene in choice when some kind of regulation is nec-
essary (for example, setting a default),41 and would be “asymmetric” in 
the sense that little harm would be done to people whose wanting and 
liking systems are well-synched.42  
Paternalism could take two mild forms, licensing and dramatizing. 
“Licensing” is checking whether wanting and liking are sufficiently syn-
chronized to permit a person to make choices on his own (presumably 
in a particular domain). “Dramatizing” is using mechanisms to remind 
the wanting system, at the time of choice, about liking that may be over-
looked or missynchronized with wanting.  
A. Licensing 
Driving tests provide a model for how licensing might occur, as a 
way to certify sufficient education of the wanting system. Because 
adolescents develop the hand-eye coordination and patience to drive 
safely at different ages, and learning to drive takes time and supervi-
sion, the current policy makes sense: prohibit driving by all children 
up to a certain age;43 issue learner’s permits that allow driving only 
when a supervising adult is present (so the learners can learn); then 
force would-be drivers to pass written and physical driving tests, pref-
erably with periodic retesting and other constraints (such as license 
suspension after accidents).  
One can imagine a “credit-card permit” test that is conceptually 
similar to a driving test. Treat a credit card as a piece of equipment that 
                                                                                                                      
 40 A shadow is always cast on this type of analysis by the nagging question, “How can we 
be so sure that they won’t like it?” There are two central problems: a slippery slope, and capture. 
The slippery slope argument is that interfering with OCD patients might make it legally or po-
litically easier for more interference in similar behaviors that are less scientifically grounded as 
disorders. The capture concern is that paternalistic policies will be guided or shaped (in their 
detail) by special interests who either profit from interference (for example, prohibiting price 
advertising for eyeglasses) or who want to “save others” (for example, religious fanatics). A full 
analysis of any policy should, of course, anticipate both slippery slope escalation and capture. It is 
too much to ask at this early stage, however, when details of even a single policy are speculative, 
to anticipate these problems and respond to them, at least in this short Essay.  
 41 See generally Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am 
Econ Rev 175 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159 (2003). 
 42 See generally Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U Pa L Rev 1211 (2003). 
 43 Some states have a “farm license” that allows very young children to drive in certain 
situations. For example, in North Dakota, fourteen-year-olds can drive farm vehicles within 150 
miles of their farm. License Classifications (North Dakota Dept of Transportation 2005), online 
at http://www.state.nd.us/dot/dlclass.html (visited Jan 17, 2006). 
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a user should know how to operate. Require potential borrowers to 
take a quiz with some basic questions, like how rapidly interest com-
pounds and how long it takes to pay off a $1,000 balance if minimum 
payments are made and interest accumulates. Perhaps have them speak 
with a counselor or with experienced adults, some of whom used cards 
wisely and others who declared bankruptcy and regret it. The test could 
also use the opportunity to educate potential borrowers about basic bor-
rowing rates and phenomena (much as driving tests remind people of 
traffic laws and some facts). The paternalism here is asymmetric because 
if borrowers know these facts, the test can be designed to be easy to pass.  
B. Dramatizing 
Another mild paternalistic intervention could be used in cases 
where one suspects the wanting system is not accounting for future 
liking or disliking correctly, by bringing future liking and disliking viv-
idly into the present. This is often done in “scared straight” films and 
talk-show interventions that show juvenile delinquents what prison is 
like.44 Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) (one of the more successful treat-
ment programs) uses vivid testimonials by other AA members that 
remind sober alcoholics of all the crazy and destructive things that 
alcoholics do when they are drinking. Teenagers in high school 
programs can be made to carry around a baby who periodically simu-
lates an infant’s typical needs (crying, changing, nursing), to dramatize 
the constraint that results from early parenthood. 
A combination of nutritional modeling and computer morphing 
of a body image could be used to show a person, for example, what 
they would look like in one year if they continue their steady diet of 
fast food or, oppositely, if they stuck with their personal trainer three 
times a week for a year.  
C. Calibration 
A strong paternalistic intervention is to try to calibrate liking di-
rectly, and then require choosers to consider their liking ratings when 
making choices (weak form) or to force them to choose the goods 
they liked most (strong form). Of course, the success of this technique 
depends on how well liking is measured.  
                                                                                                                      
 44 Unfortunately, the available evidence suggests these programs don’t work very well. See 
Surgeon General, Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General 95 (2001), online at 
http://media.shs.net/ken/pdf/surgeon/SG.pdf (visited Jan 17, 2006) (discussing results that show 
shock programs such as Scared Straight have equal or higher rearrest rates than exposure to no 
program at all).  
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The kind of thing I have in mind is a blind taste test—tasters rate 
objects, and then automatically choose the one they rated most highly. 
This could improve choice if there is a component of wanting, like a 
brand name, that is not a genuine component of liking. But of course, 
if taste is not the only component of liking, then true liking is mis-
measured by this kind of calibration. 
D. Delegating Choice 
When there are wanting-liking gaps, it is possible that somebody 
else knows more about what you would really like than you do. Hav-
ing the local wine connoisseur at dinner choose the wine for the table 
is a common and good practice. From our point of view, delegating 
choice is wise if the expert knows about typical patterns of mistakes—
commonly wanted choices that are typically disliked later (“don’t fill 
up on bread; save room for dessert”). Allowing experts some say in a 
person’s choice is a form of paternalism; in the weak form, the chooser 
is forced to hear an expert opinion (for example, a marriage coun-
selor’s report); in the strong form, the expert can overrule the choice 
or impose a choice.45 
Arranged marriages are an interesting example of various degrees 
of this sort of delegation. Ignoring externalities like family pride and 
business connections cemented by marriage, the argument for arranging 
a marriage is that members of a prospective couple know less about 
what kind of people they will truly like in the long run than a match-
maker (often a parent) does. The couple’s judgments might naturally 
overweigh observable short-run attributes (for example, attractiveness 
and sex appeal) and underweigh less observable long-run attributes (for 
example, fidelity or good parenting), while wiser and older matchmak-
ers weight these attributes more accurately.  
Indeed, a small part of this concept is already built into law: in all but 
three American states, minimum marriage ages are lower with parental 
consent than without consent. This gap in consent ages can be seen as a 
policy that permits marriage at age fifteen (in Utah, for example), but 
with a parental veto that can delay marriage until age eighteen.46 
E. Promoting Learning 
In the face of status quo bias, a common type of wanting-liking 
mistake might be underexperimenting to find out what you really like 
most. If this is so, a paternalistic policy that subsidizes or forces experi-
                                                                                                                      
 45 One argument about the influence of defaults is that they implicitly convey information 
about the best choices.  
 46 Utah Code Ann § 30-1-9 (2005).  
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mentation could be justified, especially for momentous decisions with 
irreversible consequences—like choosing a profession, or a spouse.    
Another example is hospital rotations, in which interns are ex-
posed to many different types of medicine (presumably to help them 
learn what specialty appeals to them most).  
The Amish tradition of “rumspringa” is a model for forced ex-
perimentation (although it serves a different purpose than I have in 
mind). At the age of sixteen, Amish youths are released from the stric-
tures of the church and allowed to “run around” (which is the mean-
ing of the Pennsylvania Dutch term). After some months or years, 
they can choose to be baptized and enter the church as an adult, but 
must then accept restrictions on behavior and dress; if they don’t, typi-
cally the disappointed Amish family cuts off all contact. (Around 90 
percent return to the church.) The philosophy behind rumspringa is 
that paternalism is acceptable until sixteen, but after that point, a young 
adult should be entitled to make an informed decision about lifelong 
membership, and can only do so by exploring the “Devil’s Playground” 
(Amish slang for the decadent outside world—such as my neighbor-
hood in Los Angeles, where the reality TV show “Amish in the City” 
was filmed).  
A “minirumspringa” could include mandatory field trips to for-
eign countries for high school students, so they can see another part of 
the world, exposure to arts and sports they are unfamiliar with, and 
“international day” food smorgasbords. This kind of experimentation 
could be bundled into educational experiences in public schools or 
universities.  
F. Can Markets Equate Wanting and Liking? 
Of course, paternalism may be unnecessary if private market trans-
actions promote learning, or bring wanting and liking together. So it is 
important to ask whether markets can equate wanting-liking gaps. The 
answer is likely to depend on details of the phenomenon and on some 
aspects of industry structure and technology.  
A crucial feature is self-awareness: Do people know they want 
what they don’t like (or vice versa)? Put differently, do they have a 
metapreference for restraining wanting (do they want not to want)? 
In cases like addiction, individuals seem to vary on this dimension. So 
there is a hope for at least some people to contract privately for help 
(for example, voluntary drug rehab, or gastric bypass “stomach sta-
pling” surgery for obesity).47  
                                                                                                                      
 47 Stomach stapling is an interesting case. It is an extreme surgery in which the stomach is 
“stapled” down to the size of a shot glass, and part of the duodenum is removed to create a di-
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In general, when consumers have limited rationality or willpower, 
there will be a tug-of-war in which firms compete to profit from “ex-
ploiting” them—for example, showing tempting hamburger commer-
cials—and to profit from protecting them. What happens in equilib-
rium will take some careful thought and a lot of information about the 
nature of the wanting-liking gap, consumer self-awareness, and other 
details. 
For example, firms could profitably exploit shopaholics by making 
it very easy to feel the pleasure of buying (for example, QVC home 
shopping network—“operators standing by!”), or by creating stringent 
return policies. Alternatively, firms could help shopaholics with other 
institutional fixes: rental markets for goods that are often little-used, 
like gym equipment; and low-cost trading institutions for getting rid of 
unused goods, like flea markets and eBay (and eBay consignment firms 
that sell on eBay for you).48 The latter institutions enable economic bu-
limia—shopaholics can enjoy the pleasure of buying goods, while dis-
gorging the goods later if they are unused.  
IV.  TOWARD A POSITIVE WANTING-LIKING  
THEORY OF PATERNALISM 
The arguments above are a very rough sketch—science fiction, at 
this point—of how neuroscientific understanding of wanting and lik-
ing could eventually inform a reasoned approach to selective paternal-
ism. But this framework might also have some value as a positive the-
ory to explain paternalism that is widely accepted, and also explain 
differences in paternalism across history and cultures.  
Below are some examples of where paternalistic restrictions are 
already in place. I know too little about any of these domains to do the 
proper scholarship, but the ideal positive analysis would work like so: 
ask whether regulations are justified in wanting-liking terms, and look 
                                                                                                                      
gestive shortcut. Postsurgery patients report having to eat small amounts regularly. A large ma-
jority lose a large amount of weight and keep it off. Some are such compulsive eaters that they 
eat too much and bust the staples. Interestingly, the large majority of patients are female. It is 
also notable that these $25,000 surgeries are very profitable. So hospitals are eager to do the 
surgery, which shows how supply-side considerations are important in determining wanting-
liking gaps in equilibrium. See Lisa Girion, Hospitals Hunger for Losses, LA Times A1 (June 7, 
2005) (discussing the popularity, profitability, and potential risks of stomach stapling surgery). 
See also Atul Gawande, Complications: A Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science 178–79 (Met-
ropolitan 2002) (noting that gastric-bypass surgery is effective for more than 80 percent of pa-
tients). 
 48 In the revealed-preference approach, generous return policies presumably indicate that 
returns are rare, or that returned goods are random forecasting mistakes (which is consistent 
with a view of rational choice in which people can’t always guess perfectly what they’ll like).  
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for historical or cross-sectional variations in wanting-liking gaps as 
justification for different regulations.  
A. Minors  
People under the age of eighteen are restricted from a great 
many activities. In the United States, different states have various ages 
at which minors can legally drive cars, buy cigarettes, drink alcohol, 
consent to sex, quit school, and get married. I’m not an expert on the 
history and basis for these restrictions, but presumably they are all at 
least loosely grounded in some presumption that wanting and liking 
systems in minors are not fully connected by learning (and in concerns 
for externalities, such as those caused by reckless teenage drivers). 
As the brain develops, it is very unlikely that all minors develop 
wanting-liking synchrony at the same rate. Of course, there is obvi-
ously an advantage to having an easily enforced step function rule, 
like prohibiting alcohol use by people under twenty-one, even if it is 
understood that some teenagers are able to “handle it” (and some 
adults over twenty-one are not). Nonetheless, a litmus test for want-
ing-liking synchrony could conceivably be used as a substitute for uni-
form rules based on age.  
B. Sexual Age of Consent  
Sex is a challenge for paternalism. Because there is little external-
ity (other than potential pregnancy, family honor, and so forth), con-
sent age restrictions must have to do with either limiting competition 
or pure paternalism. Legal consent ages are remarkably similar 
worldwide, averaging sixteen years old.49 In the United States, consent 
ages vary, and the minimum ages across the world range from twelve 
(Mexico, the Philippines, Panama, and Zimbabwe) to twenty (Tuni-
sia).50 
C. Mental Incompetence  
Tests of mental competence might be understood in this way. A 
typical criterion in psychiatric evaluation of involuntary commitment 
is whether a patient is a “danger to self and others.” A danger to self 
can easily be construed as the capacity to choose (want) what is harm-
ful (disliked).  
                                                                                                                      
 49 Worldwide Ages of Consent (2005), online at http://www.avert.org/aofconsent.htm (vis-
ited Jan 17, 2006). 
 50 Few parts of the world have different ages for boys and girls (despite striking evidence 
of differences in teenage development, or perhaps because of that evidence). Bolivia, Hong 
Kong, and Iran have lower ages for girls, and Botswana has a lower age for boys. Id.  
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An interesting example, although not intended as paternalism per 
se, comes from a most unlikely source—Judge Richard Posner’s blog. 
In thinking about mandatory retirement, Posner wrote,  
I wish to make a suggestion that would achieve the principal bene-
fits of mandatory retirement without the principal costs. It is sim-
ply this: beginning at age 70, require every life-tenured professor 
and every life-tenured judge to take a test of mental acuity every 
five years. (I use these simply as examples of “light” jobs from 
which the occupant is unlikely to be forced to retire by the de-
mands that the job places on him.) The test results would be 
available to the members of the professor’s department or the 
judge’s court but to no others. The results would not be a basis for 
a determination of incapacity; they would not even be admissible 
in a competence hearing. The expectation rather is that a poor 
test result would persuade the individual, perhaps by persuading 
his colleagues who would in turn persuade him, or persuade mem-
bers of his family to persuade him, to retire voluntarily.51 
As he notes, Posner is not eager to use such tests paternalistically 
to restrict a person’s employment opportunities, but one could imag-
ine doing so in extreme cases or in conjunction with other measures of 
workplace competence.  
D. Cooling Off  
“Cooling off” laws allow consumers to breach contracts for pur-
chases within some period (typically short, such as three days).52 Such 
laws are easily understood as an expression of the belief that consum-
ers in a “hot” emotional state may want something, but later realize 
they don’t need it, can’t afford it, or won’t like it. (Such laws might 
also help in resolving household disputes, but the law typically makes 
no restrictions on married couples.)  
E. Sin Taxes  
“Sin taxes” are designed to internalize externalities, and possibly 
“internalities” from consumption of sinful goods like alcohol and ciga-
rettes. Obviously, an ideal policy should be grounded in a specific 
                                                                                                                      
 51 Richard Posner, Refusing to Retire: What Can Be Done When People Overstay Their 
Welcome, The Becker-Posner Blog (June 5, 2005), online at http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/06/refusing_to_ret.html (visited Jan 17, 2006). 
 52 See, for example. Camerer, et al, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1238–47 (cited in note 42) (discuss-
ing “cooling off” in regards to consumer protection, family law, settlement agreements, and other 
potential applications).  
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model of how much taxes will reduce consumption, and how large 
externalities and internalities are. Gruber and Köszegi’s53 approach is a 
good modern example that computes an optimal sin tax from a par-
ticular model. It is easy to quibble with the details of their work or the 
(large) sin tax they deduce. The point, however, is that sin taxes do 
exist. In the wanting-liking framework, they are a blunt instrument 
that substitutes a wanting-system forecast of future-disliking with a 
current budget constraint that presumably enters into wanting.  
CONCLUSION 
The idea in this highly speculative Essay is simple: there is evi-
dence from mice with gene “knockdowns” that wanting (choice) and 
liking (hedonic reaction) are dissociated. There are many types of evi-
dence with humans too—like addicts who report a compulsion to use 
drugs, but say they get no pleasure (admittedly, all this evidence relies 
on direct measurement of liking).  
This type of evidence invites a wanting-learning-liking interpreta-
tion of choice and utility. Wanting guides choice, and liking is the same 
as the hedonic (Benthamite) concept of utility. Learning is a process by 
which the wanting system comes to know what the liking system likes.  
A historical discursion on the development of revealed-preference 
theory54 is a reminder that equating unobserved utility with observed 
choice—assuming wanting forecasts liking correctly—was a conven-
tional simplification, not the result of any proof or data. At the same 
time, Pareto, who advocated such a simplification, readily admitted 
that assuming that choices match the “subjective fact” of utility is jus-
tified by restricting attention to repeated actions, where learning has 
had a chance to work. (His view is echoed by recent advocates of a 
“discovered preference hypothesis.”) By emphasizing repetition and 
learning as the conditions under which wanting and liking coincide, 
Pareto is actually a surprising progenitor for the ideas in this Essay.  
Distinguishing wanting, liking, and learning does two things: It 
generalizes revealed-preference theory, because conventional revealed-
preference is the special case where learning has taught wanting what is 
liked. And it provides a language for talking about paternalism. Gov-
ernment paternalism is justified if there is a verifiable gap between 
wanting and liking, markets do not close the gap, and no other harms 
are created.  
Here are a few very rough ways paternalism might work to equate 
wanting and liking:   
                                                                                                                      
 53 See Gruber and Köszegi, 116 Q J Econ at 1285–93 (cited in note 35).  
 54 See Bruni and Sugden, The Road Not Taken 1 (cited in note 2). 
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• Licensing—checking that a person has informed beliefs that in-
fluence expected liking (for example, a “credit card driver’s test”); 
• Dramatizing—making future components of liking vivid; 
• Calibrating—seeing if a person’s wanting and liking are matched, 
and if not, forcing choice based on measured liking; 
• Delegating choice—allowing an expert who can forecast liking 
to make or constrain a choice (for example, matchmaking); and 
• Promoting learning—preventing nonwanting of goods that peo-
ple would actually like by forcing experimentation (à la Amish 
rumspringa).  
Finally, paternalistic policies are already in place regulating the 
minimum age of marriage and sexual consent, judgment of mental 
competence, cooling off provisions in sales, and prohibition or sin taxa-
tion of drugs and alcohol. The wanting-liking-learning framework could 
be used positively to understand how these policies came about, and 
why they vary historically and across jurisdictions.  
